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Conflict of Laws Problems Under
the Uniform Commercial Code
By ROBERT K. CuLnEN*
When and if all of the states adopt the Uniform Commercial
Code, conflict-of-laws problems in the commercial field will be
reduced to those that grow out of transactions involving foreign
countries, and those that may grow out of differences between
states in the judicial interpretation of the Code. However, at the
present time, with only four states having adopted the Code, with
fairly slow progress to be expected in its adoption by other states,
and with ultimate adoption by all the states a goal that past
experience with uniform acts would indicate will not be achieved,
we may anticipate the need to be concerned about conflict-of-
laws problems.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that there are two
main points of time at which the conflict-of-laws aspects of a
commercial transaction require the attorney's attention. The
first is the time of entering into the transaction and drafting the
contract papers. As will presently be brought out, the Code offers
the parties an opportunity, at the drafting stage, to exercise some
control over the question of which state's law shall govern. The
second point of time is, obviously, when litigation arises. Here
again the party bringing the litigation may have some limited
power of control over which state's law will govern, to the ex-
tent that he has any choice in the selection of the forum.
With respect to six particular types of transactions, the Uni-
form Commercial Code' states a specific rule as to which state's
law shall govern. The scope of the transactions to which the
specific rules apply is limited, and for that reason discussion of
the specific rules will be deferred to a later point in this presen-
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tation. For commercial transactions generally, including prac-
tically all transactions of sales and commercial paper, the Code
merely sets forth two general principles, one relating to the right
of the parties to choose the applicable law, and the other relating
to the application of the Code in the absence of an agreement.
The main portion of this discussion will be addressed to those
provisions.
The general conflict-of-laws provisions of the Code are set
forth in section 1-105. Subsection (1) of that section is as follows:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a trans-
action bears a reasonable relation to this state and also
to another state or nation the parties may agree that the
law either of this state or of such other state or nation
shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agree-
ment this Act applies to transactions bearing an appro-
priate relation to this state.
The exception introducing the subsection has reference to the
six specific rules of which mention has been previously made,
and in subsection (2) of the section it is stated in substance that
where one of the specific rules specifies the applicable law, a
contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by
the law so specified. For the moment, all that is important to
keep in mind with respect to the exception is that the specific
rules for particular transactions may limit the right of the parties,
at the contracting stage, to choose the applicable law.
The requirements of an orderly presentation lead us to con-
sider first the scope and extent of the right of the parties to choose
the applicable law in commercial transactions generally, under
the provision that when a transaction bears a reasonable, relation
to this state and also to another state, the parties may agree as
to which of those state's law shall apply. One consideration will
involve the meaning of this provision as it may be interpreted by
the courts of this state when litigation over a commercial trans-
action arises in this state. Another will be, to what extent may
the courts of another state, not having adopted the Code, recog-
nize a contractual choice by the parties of the applicable law,
when litigation over the transaction arises in such other state.
As concerns the interpretation of the Code provision by the
courts of a state which has adopted the Code, it is obvious that
[Vol. 48,
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the key words are "reasonable relation." The Code says that
the parties may agree to the application of the law of any state
to which the transaction bears a reasonable relation. In the
official comments of the drafters of the Code, it is stated that the
test of "reasonable relation" is similar to that laid down by the
Supreme Court in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. 2 In
that case, the question was whether a contract for the lending
of money should be governed by the law of New York, where
the contract was made, or by the law of Pennsylvania, where the
contract required the repayment to be made. Under the New
York law the contract would be invalid as usurious, but under
the Pennsylvania law it would be a valid contract. The Supreme
Court, in holding that the Pennsylvania law applied, indicated
that the parties may lawfully contract for the application of the
law of any state which has a "normal relation" to the transac-
tion, and quoted from Wharton's text a statement to the effect that
the motive of the parties in contracting that the law of a par-
ticular jurisdiction shall apply is of no concern if the designated
jurisdiction has a "natural and vital connection with the trans-
action."3
Another statement from the official comments is that ordin-
arily the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a "sig-
nificant enough portion" of the making or performance of the
contract is to occur or does occur. So we find, for what help it
may be, that "reasonable relation" may mean "normal' relation,
or "natural and vital connection with," or "significant enough
portion."
Some indication of what attitude the Kentucky courts may
be expected to take in regard to the right of the parties to deter-
mine by contract what state's law shall govern, may be found
in the decision in Big Four Mills, Ltd. v. Commercial Credit
Co.4 The facts were that Commercial Credit Company, a Mary-
land corporation, loaned money to Big Four Mills, a Kentucky
corporation. The contract was made in Maryland, and the money
advanced to Big Four was credited to Big Four's account in a
Maryland bank. Repayments were made to Commercial in Mary-
land. The contract provided that it should "be construed and gov-
2274 U.S. 408 (1927).
3Id. at 408.
4807 Ky. 612, 211 S.W.2d 881 (1948).
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erned by the laws of the state where it is accepted by Commercial
Credit," which was Maryland. Under Kentucky law, the contract
would be a usurious one; under Maryland law the defense of
usury would not be available. In holding that the Maryland
law applied, the Kentucky Court of Appeals quoted from Amer-
ican jurisprudence to the effect that the courts will apply the
law of the state called for in the contract, if the parties were
"acting in good faith and not for the purpose of evading the
law of the real situs of the contract,"5 and that the only question
for the court is whether the parties "acted in good faith or in bad
faith and for the purpose of evading the law of the place to which
their contract was really referable."6 We may note here that we
are supplied with two more possible substitutes for the Code's
term, "reasonable relation;" namely, "real situs" and "really refer-
able."
Following the quotations from American jurisprudence, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, by way of supplementation, added
these words:
Implicit in the rule is that some vital element of the trans-
action (i.e. execution, performance, intent) is connected
with the state whose law is sought to be invoked. If so,
we should respect the presumption that the parties intend
to enter into a legal rather than an illegal contract .... 7
So we may add "vital element" to our list of substitute terms for
"reasonable relation."
It is significant to notice that although the Kentucky court
quoted with apparent approval the language of American juris-
prudence with respect to "good faith" and "bad faith," when the
court came to state the rule in its own language it placed em-
phasis on the question of the connection of a vital element of
the transaction with the state whose law is called for in the con-
tract, and invoked a presumption of good faith. This is consistent
with the view taken by the Supreme Court in the Philadelphia
Warehouse case, that motive is not a controlling consideration.
It is believed that it may be reasonably safe to predict that the
Kentucky Court of Appeals will not take a critical attitude to-
wards provisions of commercial contracts specifying what state's
511 Am. Jur. Conflict of Laws § 157, at 462 (1937).
6 bid.
7 307 Ky. at 622, 211 S.W.2d at 837.
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law shall govern, and will be liberal in applying the "reasonable
relation" test of the Code, to the end of giving effect to the con-
tract's choice of territorial law wherever at all reasonable. Trouble
maybe anticipated only in situations where one broad commer-
cial transaction involves a series of component transactions that
separably involve only one phase of commercial law. For ex-
ample, a particular business deal may involve a sale, and the
issuance and transfer of commercial paper, letters of credit, and
documents of title. May the parties validly contract that the law
of a designated state shall govern the entire transaction, even
though some of the components of the transaction, considered
alone, do not have any connection with that state? Frankly, the
answer to that question is not known, nor can it be said where
the answer may be found. One can only guess that the answer
may depend on the extent to which the various components are
interrelated and connected, and the relative proportion of the
entire transaction that may be considered to have a relation to
the designated state.
So far, we have been considering the question of possible
interpretations, by the courts of a state which has adopted the
Code, of the Code provision concerning the right of the parties
to contract for the application of the law of a designated state.
Of equal importance is the question of what attitude may be
expected to be taken towards this right of contract by the courts
of states in which the Code is not in effect. It is reasonable to
assume that some states will follow the test laid down in the
Philadelphia Warehouse case, of "normal relation" or "natural
or vital connection." Others may approach the question from
.the standpoint of good faith or bad faith, or fraud." However,
it probably is safe to say that in most jurisdictions the parties'
contractual choice of the state whose law shall govern will be
accepted, if there is any reasonable and legitimate basis for it.
So, in the final analysis, it may be said that the provision of the
Code with respect to the right of the parties to choose by contract
what law shall apply does not represent any substantial change
from the general common-law rule.
We now come to the question of the application of the Code
to transactions in which the parties have not exercised their
8See 11 Am. Jur. Conflict of Laws § 119, at 404-7 (1937).
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right to select by contract which state's law shall apply. Section
1-105 of the Code makes this simpl6 statement: "Failing such
agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropri-
ate relation to this state."
An obvious question at the outset is: What is the difference
between a "reasonable relation" and an "appropriate relation?"
The official comments shed no light on this question, and do not
indicate from what source came the term "appropriate rela-
tion." The comments speak of the question of whether a trans-
action has "significant contacts" with the state which has adopted
the Code, but seem to indicate that having significant contacts
is not synonymous with having an appropriate relation-rather
that the question is whether the contacts have enough sig-
nificance to justify classifying the relation as appropriate. My
guess would be that a relation must be something more than
barely reasonable, in order to be considered appropriate. This
is on the basis that the Code indicates a policy to give effect
to the parties' choice of applicable law if at all reasonable, but
to condition the courfs choice of applicable law upon such a
relation of the transaction to the state as would of itself suggest
appropriateness.
Before further exploring this phase of the question, it would
be well to present two quotations that will give indication of the
difficulties under which we labor. One is from the Big Four Mills
case, previously mentioned. It is this:
The question as to the particular state law which shall
govern the construction and enforcement of a contract is
one of the most confusing in the field of conflict of laws.
Decisions from various jurisdictions apply three different
rules: (1) the place of making, (2) the place of perform-
ance and (8) the place of intent .... 9
The writer of the opinion might well have added that his own
court has applied at least two different rules. In such cases as
Clarey v. Union Central Life Insurance Co.,10 and Fry Bros. v.
Theobold,11 the Kentucky court said that a contract is governed
and controlled, and its validity determined, by the laws of the
state where it is made. But in Arnett v. Pinson,"2 and in Wedding
9 307 Ky. at 619, 211 S.W.2d at 835.
10 143 Ky. 540, S.W. 1014 (1911).
11215 Ky. 146, 265 S.W. 498 (1924).
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v. First Nat'l Bank, 3 the court said that the place of perform-
ance governs the validity and construction of the contract.
The other quotation is from American Jurisprudence, as fol-
lows:
It is apparent . . . that there is more confusion in this
field of conflict of laws than in any other. Even upon a
casual inspection of the authorities, the reader is met with
the apparently illogical situation that all three rules-the
place of maling, the place of performance, and the place
of intent-are cited as the controlling principle. Very
generally, and often in a particular jurisdiction, any one
or two and even all three of these principles have been
laid down in different cases, and occasionally, even in the
same case. Not only do the cases not mention each other
or generally try to reconcile these apparent inconsistencies,
but the problem itself has been obviously disregarded by
the courts .... As a rule no effort has been made to dis-
tinguish between the problems and either one rule or
another has been generally quoted and applied in a very
desultory and irresponsible fashion.
14
Upon this optimistic and encouraging note we will continue the
discussion.
It should be said that although confusion seems to be pre-
dominant, there have been some instances of attempted recon-
ciliation of the inconsistent common-law rules. For example,
the Supreme Court, in Scudder v. Union Nat't Bank,:5 attempted
to segregate the rules as follows: (1) matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation, and validity of the contract are to be
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made;
(2) matters connected with the performance are to be regulated
by the law of the place where the contract by its terms is to be
performed; and (8) matters relating to procedure depend upon
the law of the forum.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws, in sections 332 and
358, makes a comparable segregation of the rules as between the
place of making and the place of performance.
It is doubtful, however, whether the conflicts provision of
the Code contemplates any such parceling out of a commercial
12 33 Ky. L. Rep. 36, 108 S.W. 852 (Ct. App. 1908).
Is280 Ky. 610, 133 S.W.2d 931 (1939).
31 11 Am. Jur. Conflict of Laws § 116 (1937).
1591 U.S. (1 Otto) 406 (1875).
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transaction among the laws of several states. The Code says
that it applies to "transactions bearing an appropriate relation
to this state," and the implication is that if there is an appro-
priate relation, the Code shall govern the entire transaction.
Of course, this raises again the question, mentioned at an earlier
point in this discussion, of whether a general commercial deal,
involving several subordinate contractual arrangements, is one
transaction. Again, the answer is not clear, and probably will
depend upon the extent of inter-relation of the various com-
ponents, and the relative importance of those components that
do have a direct relation to the Code state.
At this point it would seem appropriate to call attention
to the fact that in the original draft of the Code, which
was adopted in Pennsylvania, section 1-105 spelled out
in detail a set of rules for determining when the Code should
apply to a multi-state transaction. These detailed rules were
severely criticized by the New York Law Revision Commission,
and were given a sound thumping by Professor Max Rheinstein. 6
However, Judge Goodrich wrote of them with approval 17
The net result of the criticism was that the detailed rules
were discarded in favor of the simple statement of the require-
ment of an "appropriate relation," which appears in the present
official text of the Code as adopted by Massachusetts, Kentucky,
and Connecticut.
A brief reference to one set of the former detailed rules may
perhaps be of some value in shedding light on the question of
what may be considered to be an appropriate relation of a com-
mercial transaction to a Code state.
Subsection (2) of former section 1-105 provided that the
articles on Sale, Documentary Letters of Credit, and Documents
of Title should apply whenever any contract or transaction within
the terms of any one of those articles either:
(a) was made, offered or accepted or the transaction
occurred within the Code state; or
(b) was to be performed or completed wholly or in
part within the Code state; or
16 Rheinstein, "Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code," 16 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 114 1951).
17 Goodrich, "Conflicts Niceties and Commercial Necessities," 1952 Wis. L.
Rev. 199.
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(c) related to or involved goods which were to be or
were in fact delivered, shipped or received within the
Code state; or
(d) involved a bill of lading, warehouse receipt or other
document of title which was to be or was in fact issued,
delivered, sent or received within the Code state; or
(e) consisted of an application or agreement for a
credit made, sent or received within the Code state, or
involved certain credits issued in the Code state, or in-
volved any negotiation within the Code state of a draft
drawn under a credit.
It will be observed that these rules would permit application
of the Code to a transaction which touched the Code state only
in a most casual, or even accidental, way. For illustration, if a
Michigan businessman vacationing in Kentucky sent a wire
accepting an offer for a sales contract previously made to him,
at home, by another Michigan businessman, for the sale and
delivery of goods in Michigan, Kentucky courts could apply the
Code to the entire transaction because the acceptance was made
in Kentucky. Or if through pure accident, goods intended to be
shipped from Illinois to Georgia were in fact shipped to Ken-
tucky, the courts of this state could apply the Code to all ques-
tions arising with respect to the sales contract.
It is very doubtful that such casual or accidental contacts as
these would be held to constitute an "appropriate relation"
under the terms of the present Code. A reasonable assumption
would be that in abandoning the former detailed rules the inten-
tion was to require some more substantial contact than the min-
imum contacts permitted under the former rules.
It is possible that some of the courts of Code states may apply
the so-called "grouping of contacts" test, under which effect if
given to the law of the state which has the most significant con-
tacts with the matter in dispute.' However, there is nothing
in the language of the Code provision to require a weighing of
significant contacts, and there would seem to be full justifica-
tion for applying the Code where the transaction has some sig-
nificant contacts with the Code state, even though these contacts
may not be the most significant.
18 See Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 829 U.S. 156
(1946); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 805 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
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It might appear that the courts of the Code states will be
subject to no controls other than their own discretion in finding
whether a particular transaction has an appropriate relation to
their state. But in case of an extreme or purely arbitrary decision,
it may be that the full faith and credit and due process clauses
of the Constitution will come into play.19
The only sure conclusion that can be reached with respect
to the "appropriate relation" test of section 1-105 is that there
is no way of knowing at this time what the courts will find to
be an "appropriate relation." Some courts may fall back on the
old common-law tests. Others may go to the other extreme and
apply the tests set forth in the original section 1-105. In the
comments to the official text, there seems to be a hope expressed
that the courts will lean towards finding the Code applicable
wherever possible, the particular comment being that application
of the Code "may be justified by its comprehensiveness, by the
policy of uniformity, and by the fact that it is in large part a
reformulation and restatement of the law merchant and of the
understanding of a business community which transcends state
and even national boundaries." While there is no way of fore-
telling what attitude the courts may take, there may be some
hope, at least, that the courts will be encouraged by the Code
provisions to give more deliberation to the conflicts-of-laws
problems which in the past they have completely ignored or have
treated in a desultory or irresponsible fashion.
Brief consideration will now be given to the six particular
conflict rules that are stated by the Code for certain specific
kinds of transactions. It will be remembered that these rules are
exempted from the general provisions of section 1-105.
The first specific rule is found in section 2-402, relating to
rights of the seller's creditors against sold goods. It provides in
substance for application of the law of the state in which the
goods are situated, as to whether retention of possession of the
goods by the seller is to be considered fraudulent, and as to
whether delivery or identification of goods to the contract con-
19 See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (1934); Smith, "Conflicts and Chaos or Contracts and Uniformity: The
Uniform Commercial Code," 2 Kan. L. Rev. 11 (1953).
For a discussion of several problems that may arise in transactions between
Code and non-Code states in the field of commercial paper, see Note, 24 Notre
Dame Law. (1959); see also Rheinstein, supra note 16 passim.
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stitutes a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference. This rule
would seem to be consistent with the generally recognized prin-
ciple of the common law that the law of the situs should govern
problems relating to the title of corporeal things.
The second rule appears in section 4-102, dealing with bank
deposits and collections. It is that the liability of a bank for
action or non-action with respect to any item handled by it
for the purposes of presentment, payment, or collection is gov-
erned by the law of the place where the bank is located. It is
stated in the official comments that this provision is designed
to state a workable rule for the solution of otherwise vexatious
problems of conflict of laws, and that the routine and mechan-
ical nature of bank collections make it imperative that one law
govern the activities of one office of a bank. It appears that the
rule intends that the law of the place where the bank is located
shall apply from the inception of the collection process of an
item through all phases of deposit, forwarding, presentment,
payment and remittance or credit of proceeds. General comment
with regard to this rule has been favorable.
The third specific rule is contained in section 6-102, having
to do with bulk transfers. It provides simply that the Code shall
apply to the transfer of goods located within this state. Again
this is a matter of recognizing the law of the situs of tangible
property, as concerns questions of ownership.
The fourth rule relates to investment securities, and is set
forth in section 8-106. It provides that the validity of a security
and the rights and duties of the issuer with respect to registra-
tion of transfer are governed by the law of the jurisdiction of
organization of the issuer. The official comments recite that the
purpose of this rule is to state, in accordance with the prevailing
case law, a specific conflicts rule applicable in the securities field.
It seems to be a sensible rule.
The fifth and sixth specific rules have reference to secured
transactions, and appear in sections 9-102 and 9-108. These rules
are somewhat complicated, and space will not permit me to do
more than outline their provisions. Section 9-102 states the gen-
eral proposition that the article on Secured Transactions shall
apply in so far as it concerns personal property and fixtures within
the jurisdiction of this state. In substance, this recognizes the
1960]
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common-law principle that the law of the state where the collat-
eral is located should be the governing law, without regard to
possible contacts with other jurisdictions. Presumably, the con-
verse of the rule is true, that the Code cannot be applied to
govern a secured transaction where the property is not located in
the Code state.
Section 9-103 sets forth exceptions to the general rule of
section 9-102, as concerns certain kinds of multiple-state trans-
actions. In general, they are:
(1) In the case of intangibles consisting of accounts
or contract rights, the validity and perfection of a security
interest therein and the possibility and effect of proper
filing are governed by the law of the state where the as-
signor has an office at which he keeps his records.
(2) With respect to intangibles generally, and with
respect to certain types of mobile goods, the validity and
perfection of the security interest, and filing aspects, are
governed by the law of the state wher the debtor's chief
place of business is located.
(3) If tangible property generally is already subject
to a security interest when brought into the Code state,
the validity of the interest is to be determined by the law
of the state where the property was when the security
interest attached, unless the parties understood when the
security interest attached that the property would be kept
in the Code state and it was brought into the Code state
within thirty days, in which event the validity of the security
interest is to be determined by the law of the Code state.
(4) In certain instances where property is covered by
a statutory certificate of title, the perfection of the security
interest is governed by the law of the state which issued
the certificate.
The official comments on section 9-103 cover some six double-
column pages in the publication of the official text of the
Code. It is recommended that these be read for a more complete
understanding of the problems of conflict of laws as they relate
to secured transactions.
In concluding this discussion, it is difficult to avoid mention-
ing the unhappy thought that the adoption of the Code may
have the effect, for the immediate future, of creating additional
areas of conflict of laws, particularly in the fields of sales and
[Vol. 48,
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commercial paper, in which in the past the fairly wide-spread
adoptions of the Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act had established some degree of uniformity
among the states. However, the prospects for adoption of the
Code by additional jurisdictions seem hopeful, and in the mean-
time perhaps some benefits may accrue through more attention
being devoted by the courts to conflicts problems.
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